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CHAPTER IV.
RATIFICATION.
I. On theory, ratication inapplicable in order to charge a
corporation for acts prior to incorporation.
It will have been noticed, in discussing the cases on this
subject, that the courts frequently use the term "ratification ;"
indicating that a corporation may, by ratifying a contract made
by its promoters, become liable to perform its terms, though
the contract was made before it came into existence.
Ratification is a term originating in the law of agency, which
may be used with its scientific intendment, when saying that
the act of an agent, or the act of one holding himself out as
an agent, has been ratified. It is "an agreement to adopt an
act performed by another for us," and is either express or
implied.' But that there may be a ratification in a technical
legal sense, the one purporting to ratify an act must have been
in existence at the time the act was done,2 for in theory this
adoption of an act done by another is only possible because
the act was done on our behalf, and it cannot be said in any
I Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
2 Anson on Contracts, * 335-36; Chitty on Contracts, p. 293.
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true sense that an act was done on behalf of a person not
in esse.
As is said by Pollock:' "When a principal is named or
described, but is not capable of authorizing the contract so as
to be bound by it at the time, there can be no binding ratifica-
tion, for ratification must be by an existing person on whose
behalf a contract might have been made at the time."
It is difficult to perceive, therefore, how this doctrine of
agency can be applied, (with any due regard to an exact use
of scientific terms,) in order to charge a corporation for having
knowingly taken the benefit of a contract made before its exis-
tence commenced. The better opinion seems to coincide with
this view, and in the leading case of Kelnier v. Baxter,2 Willis,
J., said: " Could the company become liable by a mere ratifi-
cation? Clearly not. Ratification can only be by a person
ascertained at the time of the act done, by a person in exist-
ence either actually or in contemplation of law, as in the case
of the assignees of bankrupts, or administrators whose title for
the protection of the estate vests by relation."
The cases denying the applicability of the doctrine of ratifi-
cation are numerous, and would seem to have the weight of
reason and authority,3 for, under the circumstances, privity of
contract is impossible.
It is, nevertheless, true that the doctrine of ratification has.
been made use of in a number of cases,4 and where it is em-
ployed it would seem that the rule of agency, (that where a
contract is ratified, the agent, if he has contracted as such, is
relieved from responsibility,) is invoked to discharge the pro-
'Contracts, * 707.
2L. R. 2 C. P. 175 (I866).
3 Melhado v. Porto Alegre Rt. R. CO., 9 C. P. 503 (1874) ; In re Empress
Engineering Co., L.,B. 16 Ch. Div. 125 (i8o); Weatherford R. R. v.
Granger, 24 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894); McArthur v. Times Co., 57 N. W.
216 (Minn. 1892); Gunn v. Assurance Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 694 (1862);
In re Northumberland Ave. Hotel Co., 33 Ch. Div. i6 (i886).
4Carey v. Des Moines Coal Co., 47 N. W. 882 (Iowa, 1891 ) ; Bruner v.
Brown, 38 N. R. 318 (Ind. 1894); Buffington v. Bardon, 5o N. W. 776
(Wise. i891); Stanton v. R. B.. Co., 59 Conn. 272 (189o) ; Paxton Cattle
Co. v. Bank, 2E Neb. 621 (1887); Hill v. Gould, 129 Mo. io6 (1895).
Dictum.
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moter of personal liability on the contract. Such, at least,
was the intimation in Whitney v. Wyman,' though we have
seen that ordinarily the rule is otherwise.2
In Buffington v. Bardon' the laxity of thought which an
adoption of this theory necessitates is clearly brought out.
That was an action by Buffington to charge the defendants,
as stockholders of a corporation, upon a contract which
plaintiff alleged that he made with the company. The lower
Court instructed the jury that, before they could render a
verdict for the plaintiff, they must find that the corporation
promised to pay the plaintiff for his services, or that after it
was organized the corporation or its authorized agents, know-
ing all the facts, adopted the services and made use of the
same. Verdict was rendered for plaintiff. Lyon, J., held,
"The law is that a corporation is liable for its own acts only
after it has a legal existence. Until that time no one, whether
a promoter or not, can sustain to the corpoi'ation the relation
of agent. Were this not so, we would have an agent without
a principal, which is an absurdity. But if one assumes to act
as agent for a prospective corporation, and in form enters into
a contract in its behalf, it is competent for such corporation,
when organized, to ratify such contract. If with full knowl-
edge of all the facts, but not otherwise, the corporation
assumes the contract and agrees to pay tie consideration, or
accepts the benefit of the contract it will be bound thereby."
Though the language of the lower Court was referred to as
being correct, judgment was reversed on the ground that there
was no evidence which could have been submitted to the jury
tending to prove a ratification with knowledge of all the
facts.
While the learned judge in this case justly characterizes as
absurd the theory that the promoters are agents of the
company, it would seem that he has fallen into a like mistake
when he boldly asserts that the technical theory of ratification
is applicable to a case in which, as he admits, there is no
1 101 U. S. 392 (1879).
2 Ante.
350 N. W. 776 (Wise. x891).
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relation of principal and agent and no principal in existence
for whom anyone might assume to act as agent.
§ 2. Where doctrine recognized, knowledge of facts a
prerequisite to liability.
Where the doctrine is employed, however, one of the pre-
requisites should be, as the above case lays down, that the
corporation must have had knowledge of all the material facts
and circumstances of the transaction which it is charged with
having ratified, for otherwise, according to the law of agency,
no ratification is possible.' This rule is recognized in the
cases.
2
§ 3. Only acts within scope of the corporate powers can be
ratfied.
It is also laid down that only acts within the scope of the
corporate powers can be ratified.' Under the doctrine of
"special capacities," according to which any act done without
the scope of the powers conferred upon the corporation, is no
act, (for there was no power with which to act,) this statement
would be literally true. The corporation could not ratify a
transaction which was beyond the powers granted, for it has
not the inherent force so to do. As a corporate act, ratification
could not take place.
But since ratification is purely a question of fact depending
in any given case upon the intention of the parties as manifested
by their acts and words, ratification is physically possible (if
the expression may be permitted) and the above proposition
must not be understood in any such sense as that the act of
ratification is one implied by law, and that the law will not
raise the implication where the act, if done by the corporation,
would have been ultra w'res
'Story on Agency, 4 239.
2Stanton v. .. R_, 59 Conn. 272 (1890).
3 Stanton v. R. B., 59 Conn. 222 (189o); Munson v. R. .. Co., IO3
N. Y. 58.
'Oakes v. Cattaraugas Water Co., 143 N. Y. App. 430 (1894);.
Howard v Patent Ivory Mfg. Co., L. R. 38 Ch. Div. 156 (1888).
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§ 4. Ratification relates back.
Ratification, as we have seen, is the adoption of an act
previously done by one who was, in fact, agent for the ratifier,.
or who assumed to act as agent for one who was in existence
at the time. It follows, therefore, that ratification relates back
to th time of the act, and the principal is bound-or acquires:
rights as of that date ;' omnis ratihabitis retrohabitur. So the
obligation binding a corporation, which has ratified a contract
made by its promoter, dates as of the" time of the original.
agreement.' It is the adoption of the old contract, not the
making of a new one.
§ 5. What acts constitute a ratifcation.
As to what constitutes a ratification, it need only be said
that the same rules apply in these cases as in those where the.
term is more truly applicable. It may be express, or implied
from carrying out the terms of the contract or acting with
reference to it.
CHAPTER V.
ADOPTION.
§ I. Conceived of as the adoption of an old contract.
Many cases, while denying, that there can be in any exact-
sense a ratification, assert that a company may become bound
by adoption.' This is not a "term of art;" there is no recog--
nized legal principle so-called, and it is to a consideration of'
1IKelner v. Baxter, L. R. 2 C. P. 174 (I866).
2 Stanton v. R. R., 59 Conn. 272 (i89o); Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa. 218-
(1872); Low v. R. R. Co., 45 N. H. 370 (1864).
3 Pittsburgh v. Quintrell, 20 S. W. 284 (Tenn. 1892) ; Huron Printing-
Co. v. Kittleson, 57 N. W. 233 (S. Da. 1894) ; Schreyer v. Turner Flour-
ing Mills, 43 P. 719 (Oregon, 1896) ; Weatherford R. R. Co. v. Granger,
24 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894) ; Colorado Land & Water Co. v. Adams.
(Colo. 1894) ; Arapahoe Ins. Co. v. Platt, 39 P. 584 (Colo. 1895) ; Battelle
v. Cement Co., 33 N. W. 327 (Mo. x887); McArthur v. Printing Co., 5i
N. W. 216 (Minn. 1892) ; Pratt v. Oshkosh Co., 62 N. W. 84 (Wisc. 1895) ;
Munson v. R. R., 103 N. Y. 58 (1886) ; Burden v. Burden, 4 N. Y. Supp.
499 (1896); Touche v. Metropolitan Co., 6 Chan.App. 671 (187o);.
Bommer v. American Spiral Hinge Co., 81 N. Y. 469 (i88o); Pa.
Match Co. v. Hapgood, i41 Mass. I45 (1886).
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what is meant by the courts when they say that a corporation
may adopt the contract and become bound thereby, that we
must now proceed.
An examination of the cases would seem to indicate that
the term has been used in two distinct senses. In some it
has signified, as the word itself denotes, an adoption of a pre-
viously formed contract; the assumption by the corporation of
the rights and liabilities created by a contract made between a
promoter and a third person. In others, the Court has shown,
either expressly or by implication, that it meant by" adoption"
the making of a new contract with the same terms as the old.
The former of these conceptions was undoubtedly in the
mind of the Court in the case of Rogers v. Land Co.'
A number of persons holding a large tract of land agreed
to form a company whose sole purpose should be the disposal
of the land in question. Each should contribute his propor-
tion of the land to the company, receiving in return script to
represent shares in the company, which should be retired as
fast as the company disposed of the land.
When the company was created, instead of paying off the
script it declared a dividend to the scriptholders. The suit
was brought by one of the scriptholders to compel the pay-
ment to be made to the retirement of the script.
Vann, J., held: "By accepting title to the land, it (the cor-
poration) adopted and ratified the agreement entered into by
all its stockholders and thereby voluntarily made itself a party
thereto and became bound thereby," and the Court thereupon
ordered that the agreement between the original owners was
binding upon the company and that profits must therefore, be
.applied to retiring the script. See also'
When this is understood, by "adoption" it is manifest that
there is little or no distinction to be drawn between it and
41 ratification" as the latter term is employed in this connection.
'34 N. Y. 197 (1892) ; Spiller v. Paris Skating Rink Co., 7 Ch. Div. 368
(1878) ; Match Co., 62 N. W. 84 (Wisc. 1895) ; 15 Law & Eq. 596 (1852).
2 Oakes v. Cattaraugas Water Co., 143 N. Y. App. 430 (1894) ; Pratt v.
,Oshkosh, 62 N. W. 84 (Wisc. 1895); Gooday v. Colchester & Stour
Valley Ry. Co., 17 Beavan, 132 (1852); Touche v. Metropolitan Ry.
Co., 6 Ch. App. 671 (1870).
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In their exact signification, adoption denotes the taking to
one's self of that with reference to which there existed no prior
relation; ratification, the confirmation of an act done without
due authority on behalf of an existing principal. But when
the term ratification is made use of in a case in which
no relationship of principal and agent exists, then, according
to the definitions given, there is nothing left whereby to
distinguish the two processes. Whatever constitutes a ratifica-
tion in this sense constitutes also an adoption, and the terms
may be used as synonymous. See'
This conception seems to be open to the objection that the
law of contract does not permit of a stranger substituting
himself for one of the original parties to a contract except by
an agreement between all of the parties concerned, based upon
a sufficient consideration. This is on the familiar principle
that liabilities cannot generally be assigned.2
Now, if we suppose a case in which the corporation has so
acted after coming into existence, that under the deeisions we
are discussing a Court would say that there had been an
adoption of the contract, would it not be a mere fiction
unsupported by the facts for the Court to imply that the
minds of the parties had met and agreed upon the substitution
of the liability of the corporation for that of the promoter ?
Yet by such mutual agreement alone, according to the law
of contract, can a substitution of liabilities take place.
But admitting that a Court would be justified in giving effect
to such a substitution on the ground of an implied agreement
betveen the parties to that effect, we are not aided in under-
standing these decisions, for in none of them does the Court
seem to base its result on the reasoning indicated. Indeed,
they appear to repudiate it, for such a substitution is, in the
words of Anson,3 "the rescission by agreement of one contract
and the substitution of a new one in which the same acts are to
IPerry v. Little Rock R. R. Co., 44 Ark. 383 (1884); Schreyer v. Turner
Flouring Mills Co., 43 P. 719 (Oregon, 1896); McArthur v. Times Print-
ing CO., 5t N. W. 216 (Minn. 1892).
2 Anson, Part III., Chapter II.
3 Contracts, p. 287.
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-be performed by different parties," but the cases under con-
-sideration all take the view that the contract binding the
-corporation is not a new one, but is the old agreement
adopted, dating back and taking effect as of the time of the
original contract.
A number of cases, however, expressly repudiate the idea
and hold that there can be no adoption of the original contract
or liability assumed by the corporation under it; and the view
may be considered discredited.
§ 2. The making If a new contract.
The better opinion as to the nature of this so-called
adoption" is, that it is the making of a new contract between
the corporation and the person with whom the promoter con-
tracted, and since it is usually implied from the actions of the
company with reference to the promoter's contract, it is gener-
.ally found that it was the intention of the parties to follow the
terms of the original agreement. Hence the rule laid down
-in the cases, that adoption, is "the making of a new contract
with the same terms as the old." 2
The distinctions taken between the theories of " ratifica-
-tion," "adoption " (understood in its primafacie significance),
and " adoption" (understood as the making of a new contract),
are rather of theoretical than of practical importance in the
majority of cases. They become useful, however, wherever
the Statute of Frauds or of Limitations is involved. An
example of this is the case of MkcArthur v. Times Printing Co.'
That was an action for damages for breach of contract. Pro-
moters of the company had employed plaintiff in behalf of the
company as advertising agent for the period of one year from
and after October I st. Plaintiff commenced to render his ser-
vices on that day, though incorporation was not complete. He
'Abbott v. Hapgood, 15° Mass. 248 (1889) ; R. R. Co. v. Sage, 65 Ill.
328 (1872); Western Screw Co. v. Cousley, 72 Ill. 531 (1874).
2 In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. Div. 125 (188o); Northum-
'berland Ave. Hotel Co., 33 Ch. Div. I6 (1886) ; McArthur v. Times Print-
ing Co., 51 N. W. 216 (Minn. 1892).
351 N. W. 216,(Minn. 1892).
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continued in the same employment for some time after the
company was formed, but was discharged within the year.
All the officers and directors knew the terms of the contract,
and plaintiff had been paid accordingly, but no formal action
had been taken by the company, recognizing th&.contract.
One of the grounds of defense was that the cothract was
void on account of the Statute of Frauds, there being no
memorandum in writing, and performance not being provided
for within the year.
Mitchell, J., held: "This Court, in accordance with what
we deem sound reason as well as the weight of authority, has
held that, while a corporation is not bound by engagements
made on its behalf by its promoters before its organization, it
may, after its organization, make such engagements its own
contracts, . . . What is called adoption in such cases is, in
legal effect, the making of a contract of the date of the adop-
tion, not as of some former date." Since the contract was
adopted, and since it was not made by the corporation until
October 16th, and was to last for one year from October Ist,
according to the terms of the original agreement, it was to be
performed (as far as the corporation was concerned) within the
year, and the statute had therefore no application. See also'
When it is said that the new contract is made with the same
terms as the old, it is apparent that if we are dealing with an
actual contract, implied from the circumstances of the case and
based upon the intention of the parties, the statement must be
taken to embody the results reached in the majority of cases
and cannot be understood as a conclusion of law, universally
applicable. Though the jury might find, in a given case, that
the corporation had undertaken in toto, according to the terms
of the promoter's contract, such a circumstance would be
purely accidental.
In the case of Standard Printing Co. v. Democrat Pub. Co.,'
'In re Empress Engineering Co., I6 Ch. Div. 125 (188o); Howard v.
Patent Ivory Mfg. Co., L. R. 38 Ch. Div. 156 (1888) ; Northumberland
Ave. Hotel Co., 33 Ch. Div. 16 (r886) ; Battelle v. Cement Co., 33 N. W.
327 (Mo. 1887).
258 N. W. 238 (Wise. x894).
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suit was brought by the latter for work done in publishing a.
paper for the former. The contention was as to the sum due-
Plaintiff had previously done the work for former owners of the
paper at a certain price. These proprietors had formed the
defendant company and turned the paper over to it, the plaintiff
continuing to do the work. Nothing was said as to the price.
Plaintiff claims that the original agreement should be the
measure of his recovery. The Trial Court found "that the
work was done upon an implied promise that the plaintiff
should be paid for it such sum as it should be reasonably
worth."
Newmafi, J., held: "This (the original agreement) was but
evidence, more or less persuasive, upon the question what was
the agreement upon which the work was done for the defen-
dant. And it was a serious question whether the Court ought
to infer a promise by the defendant to abide by the previous
contract of the promoters however clearly established."
The thought that circumstances may contradict the implica-
tion arising in any given case (that the corporation intended to
contract according to the terms of the promoter's agreement,>
was carried to a considerable length, In re Northumberland!
Avenue Hotel Co.1 Lopes, J., there said: "No doubt the com-
pany, after it came into existence, might have entered into a new
contract upon the same terms as the agreement of July 24,
1882, and we are asked to infer such a contract from the
conduct and transactions of the company after it came into
existence. It seems to me impossible to infer such a contract,
for it is clear to my mind that the company never intended to
make any new contract, because they firmly believed that the-
contract of July 24 th was in existence and was a binding valid
contract."
§ 3. Formal requisites.
As in those cases which proceed upon the theory of ratifica-
tion, so in these dealing with adoption, it is held that only acts
within the scope of the corporate powers, and such as are not
133 Ch. Div. 16 (xS86).
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against law or public policy, can be adopted;' and that the
.company must have had knowledge of all the facts before it
will be bound.'
The question as to who may bind the company by adopting
the contract is purely one of agency, to be decided in each
case as it arises, and is dependent upon the character of the
agreement and the purposes of the corporation.'
CHAPTER VI.
ESTOPPEL.
§ I. When applicable.
Besides the theories which we have been considering, another
-doctrine, that of estoppel, has at times been employed in order
to charge a corporation for work done and services rendered
in its formation, or upon a contract made by its promoters.
That the liability of the corporation in such cases depended
-on estoppel was the thought of the Court in the case of Grape
Sugar & Vinegar Mfg. Co. v. Small.4  Thatwas an assumpsit
brought by Small against the company on account of a balance
-due for work done and materials furnished to the appellant. It
was shown that one Sim, acting as president of the company
but before it was duly incorporated, had employed plaintiff to
build and repair certain "tubs," the employment having lasted
till after incorporation. The defendant asked the Court to
charge "that plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the work
done and material furnished prior to the day on which the
certificate of incorporation was filed for record." This the
Court refused to do, and there being a verdict for the plaintiff
the company took an appeal.
'Schreyer v. Turner Flouring Mills Co., 43 P. 719 (Oregon. 1896);
Munson v. R. R. Co, IO3 N. Y. 58 (1886); Burden v. Burden, 4 N. Y.
Supp- 499 (1896); MeArthur v. Times Printing Co., 51 N. W. 216 (Minn.
1892).
2 Sehreyer v. Mills Co., 43 P. 719 (Oregon, 1896) ; Weatherford R. R.
v. Granger, 34 S. W. 793 (Texas, 1894); Huron v. Kittleson, 57 N. W.
234 (S. Da. 1894) ; Rogers v. Land Co., 134 N. Y. 197 (1892).
3 McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 51 N. W. 216 (Minn. 1892).
44o Md. 395 (1874).
620. CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF PROMOTERS.
The Court, in affirming the judgment, said: "If, after its
incorporation was complete, the company accepted the work
done under the contract, it will be estopped, both in law and
equity, from denying its liability on account of the same. In
other words, the appellant will not be permitted to accept the
work done and material furnished by the plaintiff under a.
contract made prior to the recording of the certificate and,.
at the same time, deny its liability under it."
In Weathelord, Etc., R. R. Co. v. Granger' the Court, in
referring to the corporation, uses the following language-
" Having exercised rights and enjoyed benefits secured to it
by the terms of a contract made by its promoters in its behalf,
a corporation should be estopped to deny its validity." See,
also, to the same effect :2
Now it will be noticed that, in the case of Grape Co. v. Small,.
just cited, the services of the plaintiff had been rendered partly
before but partly after complete organization of the company.
It had allowed the plaintiff to continue making and repairing
its tubs, with full knowledge that he was doing so under the
impression that the company would pay him according to the-
terms of the contract, not only for what he was now doing
but for what he had already done. Under such circumstances.
the doctrine of estoppel might have a legitimate application.
§ 2. When inapplicable.
But it is submitted that the language used in Weatherford!
R. R. Co. v. Granger (and the other cases cited), is too broad,
since it would include all cases in which benefits had accrued
to a corporation, as well before as after it had come into
existence. Now, as to all services rendered or goods be-
stowed upon a company before it is incorporated it would
seem that, if any liability arises, it cannot be based upon the
theory of estoppel, for the essential elements of an estoppel
are absent.
The elements of an equitable estoppel, by conduct or in.
124 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894).
2Joy v. Manion, 28 Mo. App. 55 (1887); Low v. R_ R., 4,5-N. EL 375;
(1864); Thompson on Corp., 49o.
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*PaiS, are laid down in Bispham's Equity.' It is there said,
"Equitable estoppel or estoppel by conduct has its foundation
in fraud considered in its most general sense." There must
be an intentional inducing of another to act, with a full knowl-
edge of all the facts, and the other must have acted to his
detriment.'
It would seem impossible to predicate fraud of a corpora-
tion in respect of benefits conferred upon it while in art inchoate
condition, and before it had a legal existence.
Again, though the cases suggest that the fraud which
estopped the corporation from denying its liability, consists in
enjoying the benefits which it knows have been conferred in
the expectation that they will be paid for, we have seen that
to constitute an estoppel, the one alleging it, must have been
induced to act to his disadvantage by the wrong of another,"
and it would seem to be a strained construction of the doctrine,
to hold that a corporation, by merely making use of advan-
tages of which it found itself in possession upon its birth, had
induced the conferring of those advantages upon itself.
PART III.
THE BASIS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR
PROMOTERS ACTS.
CHAPTER VII.
WHERE THE BENEFITS HAVE BEEN CONFERRED AFTER
INCORPORATION.
§ I. General considerations: A tre contract possible.
It is apparent from the foregoing examination of the cases
that in theory, at least, the courts have differed widely as to
the grounds of corporate liability. It has been alleged on the
one hand and controverted on the other that a company
comes into existence burdened with liabilities; the doctrines
1 282.
2 Bispham's Equity, Chap. IV.
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of estoppel and of ratification have been suggested as theories
upon which the corporation might be charged for the benefits
received; and, finally, it has been generally conceded that the
company may assume liability by a process of adoption,
though as to the full effect and meaning of "adoption" there
is still some doubt.
Whatever the language used, however, it is clear that the
courts have recognized the equity existing against a corpora-
tion in respect of advantages of which it has been the recipient
under a contract made by its promoters. This equity is recog-
nized in spite of the fact that on strict principle the promoter
is the only one who can be liable on the original contract, in
view of the non-existence of the corporation at the time the
contract was made.
Notwithstanding the diversity in the terminology employed,
there is a manifest uniformity in the major part of the results
reached, which suggests that the underlying pnnciples are the
same in most of the cases.
It remains, then, to consider what are the underlying prin-
ciples referred to, and how far they have been recognized by
the courts. For the purposes of this examination all the cases
may be divided into three classes:
First. Those in which the promoters have contracted for the
corporation in respect of something to be done for it after it
shall have been duly incorporated.
Second. Those in which the duties to be performed under the
contract commence before, and continue after, incorporation.
Third. Tho~e in which the contract has been fully performed
and the corporation has received the benefit before it was
legally in esse.
In cases of the first class where a corporation has been
fully organized and, knowing the terms of a contract made
between its promoters and a third party, allows the latter to
render the services contracted for under the belief that the
company intends to pay him for them, we have all the ele-
ments of a real contract; a contract implied in fact. The
concensus of opinion of all reasonable men would be that the
company must have intended to contract according to the
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terms of the former arrangement, and that in view of its con-
duct it could not be heard to deny that this was its intention.
It is in such a case, and in such a case alone, that the doctrine
of estoppel would be applicable.
§ 2. The promoter's contract a continuing offer to the company.
In these cases we should expect to find the courts acting
on the hypothesis of a true contract and endeavoring to
enforce an agreement corresponding to the intention of the
parties. So it is usually held that a contract made with a
promoter constitutes an open or continuing offer to the cor-
poration, which that body may accept upon coming into
existence.' Having accepted or adopted this offer either ex-
pressly or as is more generally the case, by implication, a
contract is formed ordinarily of the same terms as the former
one and binding upon the corporation.
As was said in Penn Matcli Co. v. Hapgood :2 "The power
of a corporation to make contracts can be exercised in accept-
ing and adopting proposed contracts made in its name and
behalf before incorporation. Such a contract must derive its
vitality from the meeting of minds when both parties are in
existence; until then it can be nothing more than an offer by
one party."
The thought was expressed even more fully in Weatherford
R. R. Co. v. Grang-er : s "Again, where the promoters of a
corporation have made a contract in its behalf to be performed
after it is organized, it may be deemed a continuing offer on the
part of the other party to the agreement, unless withdrawn by
him, and may be accepted and adopted by the corporation
after such organization; and the exercise of any right, incon-
sistent with the non-existence of such contract, ought to be
deemed conclusive evidence of such adoption."
This fiction of the continuing offer would seem to be justifi-
able as an aid in giving effect to the intention of the parties.
1 Pratt v. Oshkosh Co., 62 N. W. 8A (XVisc. 1895).
2 i41 Mass. 145 (I886).
3 24 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894).
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That in these cases we are dealing with true contracts
seems to be thoroughly established. In Howard v. Patent
Ivory Mfg. Co.,' the company, being duly organized, received
the transfer of a leasehold under an agreement made before
its existence by its promoters. It knew the terms of the
agreement and had passed a resolution undertaking to carry
them out. It was argued that, according to an earlier case,2
the terms of the original contract were not binding upon the
-company, though it might be liable to pay a reasonable sum
for the use of the property.
Kay, J., said: " In the first place I must observe that the
-question whether there was a contract between this company
and Mr. Jordan is a question not of law but of fact. Am I
bound, because in one case the Court upon evidence be-
fore it came to the conclusion as a matter of fact that
there was no binding contract, to hold that in this case
there was no such contract?" and judgment was rendered
for the plaintiff.
In Oakes v. Cattaraugas Water Co.,' the promoters con-
tracted with Oakes that the company should pay him $IOOO
if he should render certain services. After incorporation the
president, who was one of those who made the original
agreement, requested Oakes to perform the services. Having
done so, the company refused to pay the sIooo. The
lower Court non-suited plaintiff when he sued for the con-
;tract price.
The Court, after suggesting that the parties could make a
,contract on the same terms as the original one if they were so
minded, said: "Whether this was the intention and purpose
-of the president and of the defendant, and of the plaintiff, was
under the circumstances of the case a question of fact which
should have been submitted to the jury. Ratification or
adoption, which in this case mean the same thing, is legally a
.question of intention to be determined from facts and circum-
stances as one of fact, and the Court was not warranted under
I L. R. 38 Ch. Div. 156 (1888).
2 In re Northumberland Avenue Hotel Co., 33 Ch. Div. 16 (1886).
S,3 143 N. Y. App. 430.
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the circumstances in disposing of the question as one of law."
Judgment was, therefore, reversed. See also'
Since we are dealing with an obligation founded upon the
intention of the parties, certain elements must be present before
a jury would be warranted in finding that the undertaking had
been entered into by the corporation. First of these is knowl-
edge of the facts and circumstances attending the rendering of
the services. This we have seen to be a prerequisite, while
discussing the theories separately, and the same reason applies
wherever there is a contract implied in fact, for it is impossible
to say that one has either ratified or adopted a contract or
accepted an offer, when he had knowledge neither of the one
nor the other.2
If a case should arise in which benefits were conferred upon
a corporation 'after due organization without its knowledge
under a contract made prior to its formation, it would seem
that on theory the only ground of recovery would be in quasi-
contract. The point, however, has not so far arisen.
§ 3. What constitutes corporate knowledge.
It will be necessary in this connection to investigate briefly
what is considered the knowledge of the corporation. In
Davis Wheel Co. v. Davis Wagon Co.,3 it was said: "The
authorities do not agree whether a corporation is to be held
cognizant of facts which have come to the knowledge of an
officer or director unofficially; but the better opinion would
seem to be that if the officer or director is an active agent of
the corporation in the transaction affected by his knowledge,
it is not material how or when he acquired his information."
Taking the opinion here expressed to be the better one, it
'Rogers v. Land Co., 134 N. Y. 197 (r892) ; Penn Match Co. v. Hap.
good, 141 Mass. 145 (1886) ; Pratt v. Oshkosh Match Co., 62 N. W. 84
(Wise. 1895); Standard Printing Co. v. Democrat Pub. Co., 58 N. W. 238
Wisc. 1894); Spiller v. Paris Skating Rink Co., 7 Ch. Div. 368 (1878);
Northumberland Avenue Hotel Co., 33 Ch. Div. 16. (1886).
2 Schreyer v. Mills Co., 45 P. 719 (Oregon, 1896); Weatherford R. R.
v. Granger, 34 S. W. 793 (Texas, 1894) ; Huron Co. v. Kittleson, 57 N. W.
234 (S. Da. 1894) ; Rogers v. Land Co., 134 N. Y. 197 (1892).
32o Fed. Rep. 699 (1884).
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is well settled that notice of facts to individual stockholders or
corporators is not notice to the corporation I of those facts.
The same rule pertains as to a director.' Notice to an agent,
however, whose duty it is to disclose his knowledge is notice
to the company.3 The knowledge of the officers of a company
is its knowledge."
So, in Rogers v. Land Co.,5 the corporation had been formed
by joint holders of land under an agreement among themselves,
that the company should serve a certain purpose, the owners
becoming officers and directors. The Court, in enforcing the
agreement, said: "The corporation was charged by the knowl-
edge of its directors, the source of its title, and the consideration
paid for the land, with notice of the proceedings of the bond-
holders which led to its existence, as well as their object in
causing it to be organized."
§ 4. Where the promoter's contract would have been ultra vires
or illegal if made by the corporation, the company not bound.
It is also generally said that only acts within the scope of
the corporate powers and such as are not against law or public
policy can be adopted.' In view of the fact that the basis of
the obligation created by this so-called adoption is, as we have
seen, an implied contract, this statement must be taken to mean,
not that the jury would be unjustified in finding that the cor-
poration had intended to make an ultra vires or illegal contract,.
but that the effect of such intention was a nullity, and that the
purpose of the company, however clearly expressed by words
or actions, was inoperative to create a valid contractual relation.
The same thought is apparent in the cases employing the doc-
IHousatonic Bank v. Martin, i Met. (Mass.) 294 (1840).
2 Custer v. Tompkins Co. Bank, 27 P. S. 132; Weatherford R. R..
Co. v. Granger, 24 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894).
3Burt v. Batavia Paper Co., 86 Il. 66 (1877).
4 McDermot v. Harrison, 9 N. Y. Supp. 184 (189 o ) ; Bommer v. Spiral
Hinge Co., 8I N. Y. 46 9 (I88O).
5 134 N. Y. 197 (1892).
6Munson v. 1R. R., lO3 N. Y. 58 (1886) ; M Arthur v. Times Printing
Co., 5 N. W. 216 (Minn. 1892) ; Schreyer v. Turner Mills Co., 43 P. 719
(Oregon, 1896); Burden v. Burden, 4 N. Y. Supp. 499 (1896).
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trine of ratification, and was noticed under that head Again,
wherever a formal action by the board of directors, or other
corporate officers, is required by statute or the corporate
charter, in order to bind the company if it were acting in the
first instance, a like formality must have taken place before the
company is bound.' The whole question belongs rather to
the law of zltra vires acts of corporations than to that of
contracts.
Malcolm Lloyd Jr.
1 See ante.
2McArthur v. TimesPrinting Co., 51 N. W. 216 (Minn. X892); Schreyer
v. Turner Mills Co., 43 P. 719 (Oregon, 1896).
